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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LUCILE M. HALE, an Individual, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
RALPH FRAKES, an Individual, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
case No. 15771 
BRIEF OF PLAINTJFF-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision which found no cause 
of action in Plaintiff-Appellant's complaint alleging 
boundary by acquiescence. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court of the First Judicial District in 
and for the county of Box Elder dismissed Plaintiff-
Appe llant' s Complaint upon a finding of no cause of action. 
The complaint asked for damages and injunctive relief re-
quiring Defendant-Respondent to replace an old fence line 
and also ordering Defendant-Respondent from further pre-
venting or interfering in any manner with Plaintiff-
Appellant' s use of said real property. The Complaint was 
grounded on th~ theory of boundary by acquiescence and ad-
verse possession. The District court focused on the former 
theory as shall this brief. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The court in a memorandum decision found that there 
was no acqd.P.sence and dismissed the Complaint with prej-
udice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks reversal of the District 
Court of instructions sufficient to direct the District 
court to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellant, 
to grant the injunctive relief sought in the Complaint, 
and to award damages as the District Court deems proper 
FACTS FOUND UPON THE RECORD (R) 
AND 
THE REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (T) 
FACT SUMMARY 
A strong fence built long ago stood upon certain 
property. Neither Plaintiff-Appellant's living predecessors 
in title nor Defendant-Respondent's living predecessors in 
title can remember when the fence came into existence, or 
when an even older fence built in the same place was erected. 
On or about May 18, 1973, Plaintiff-Appellant purchased the 
land north of the fence and suosequent to that Defendant-
Respondent purchased the land south of the fence. Then in 
1974, without prior warning, the Defendant-Respondent up-
rooted the ancient monument which had divided the two 
properties for over forty years. This dispute concerns only 
2 
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that certain strip of land which lies between what is now 
found to be tne true boundary of Section 14 by a survey 
made after the rence was removed and the fence line. The 
following free hand sketch is a diagram of the disputed area. 
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ANNOTATED FACTS: 
Respondent's witness, Mr. John Newman, testified at 
trial that he is the predecessor in title to Respondent and 
held title to the disputed land now found to be in Section 
23 (T-120). Mr. Newman first became familiar with the 
disputed fence line in 1933 when he was assigned the task of 
rennovating an older fence (T-139). Though he testified 
that the fence was built only to control livestock and that 
he considered the fence to be off the property line (T-50), 
he admitted that, despite his awareness of a boundary 
dispute, he constructed the fence precisely over the other 
fence (T-155). Since that time he admitted that he has 
never disputed nor interferred in the exclusive use of the 
property north of the fence by Appellant nor her predeces-
sors in title (T-152). But he claims to have maintained to 
neighbors that he always considered the fence to be off his 
true boundary line (T-137). There was no substantiating 
testimony to that effect. 
The testimony of Orval Peterson, brother of Ronald 
Peterson who is Appellant's irrunediate predecessor, testified 
that from the time he was a little boy working for his 
father the fence was there (T-37) and family operations were 
always carried on right up to the fence (T-38). Orval did 
not personally remember there being a dispute regarding the 
fence as the boundary line (T45). He did recall, though, 
that a predecessor, A. E. Roche, had had some trouble and 
4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lost some land back in the twenties, but the testimony is 
very sparse as to details (T-43). He always considered the 
fence to be the boundary line, and though it may have been 
built for the additional purpose of holding cattle (T-43), 
he always farmed right to the fence (T-44). 
Dennis Larkin, another farmer in the area, confirmed 
that the fence was of ancient origin, and he personally 
knew that the fence had been there for at least thirty-
five (35) years (T-47). 
A survey was made in 1974 by the County Surveyor after 
Respondent had removed the disputed fence, and it revealed 
that the fence was some thirty-three (33) feet south of the 
line which the survey ascertained to be the true line between 
Sections 14 and 23. The survey was performed to locate the 
section corner of Sections 14, 15, 22 and 23 at the request 
of another engineer-surveyor from Tremonton, Utah. The County 
Surveyor testified that because original monuments are neces-
sary to establish a corner and "make it authentic and legal" 
(T-100) , he looked for a monument where all now know that 
Sections 14, 15, 22 and 23 meet, but could not find the monu-
ment because the spot lies in the middle of a county road (T-llC 
He also testified that a land owner would not have found a 
marker, either; like himself, the landowner would have to 
establish one (T-110). 
The witness explained the difficult labors he went 
through to locate the corner. He found a marker stone one 
mile directly west of the disputed corner, another rock one 
5 
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mile south of the corner lying on the ground in disoriented 
fashion (T-102) , and another large stone one mile east of 
the disputed corner, which stone was large, irregularly 
placed and covered with mud (T-103). He did not find a 
monument to the north of the disputed corner and concluded 
that it had probably been obliterated for many years (T-103). 
After locating the stones which served as monuments, he pro-
ceeded to check out his measurements by "tying down the 
fences", meaning, he started measuring distances in accordance 
with where the people had established boundaries themselves 
through the use of fences (T-104); but, he added that no 
consideration is given to roads or ditches in determining 
section corners (T-117). After a series of measurements, he 
put his information together (T-104), and using his best 
judgment as a surveyor and his authority as the County 
Surveyor (T-114), he marked the section corner. 
The disputed fence line was about thirty-three (33) 
feet south of what the County Surveyor determined to be the 
true boundary. The surveyor did not use the disputed fence 
as a reference point from which to work when he "tied down 
the fences" but testified that he would have used it had it 
existed (T-112). He further states that the disputed fence's 
location would not have changed his ultimate decision; he 
would have taken the fence to be the south side of the right 
of way (T-113). 
He did not testify as to how he deduced that a right 
6 
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of way existed; there are no easements or records on the 
land in dispute in either Section 23 or Section 14. 
(R-Defendant's Exhibit No. 11, Plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 5, 
6, and 7). 
Several items in Plaintiff-Appellant's abstract con-
spicuously evidence a right of way for road along the 
western boundaries of her land. There are none which show 
easements or rights of way along the southern boundary 
though there are deeds containing boilerplate that the 
conveyance is subject to easements and rights of way of 
record. There is one irregularity in the chains of title, 
though. In Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5, Item No. 10,.there is 
an Affidavit by A. E. Roche by which he reaffirms that he 
never owned an interest in land in Section 23; this is dated 
May 26, 1954 and refers to the May 24, 1926 Quit Claim Deed, 
which is Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7, Item No. 17, in which 
Roche quit claimed to a strip of land in Section 23. Both 
of these documents refer to land in Section 23 and do not 
speak of easements in Section 14. 
The physical features of the surrounding area offer no 
strong clue that the fence had been mislocated. There were 
no survey monuments which were readily visible from which to 
start measurements. The fence line lined up well with the 
south side of a county road to the west which ran east and 
west (R-Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4). A road and ditch of 
Defendant-Respondent were located south of the disputed fence 
line. 
7 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A CLAIM TO LAND UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY 
ACQUIESCENCE REQUIRES THAT THE CLAIMING PARTY ESTABLISH 
r''JUR ELF"·!l!:NTS: (A) THE LINE MUST BE OPEN, VISIBLE AND 
1'1ARKED BL MONUMENTS, FENCES OR BUILDINGS, (B) MUTUAL 
ACQUIESCENCE IN THE LINE AS THE BOUNDARY, (C) FOR A 
LONG PERIOD OF YEARS, (D) BY ADJOINING LANDOWNERS. 
ESTABLISHMENT OF ALL FOUR ELEMENTS CREATES THE PRE-
SUMPTION OF A LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENT AS TO THE 
BOUNDARY, WHICH PRESUMPTION MUST BE OVERCOME BY SPECIFIC 
EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT. HOLMES V. JUDGE, 
31 U. 269, 87 P. 1009 (1906), TRIPP V. BAGLEY, 74 U. 
57 I 276 P. 912 (1928). 
A. THE LINE MUST BE OPEN, VISIBLE, AND MARKED BY 
MONUMENTS, FENCES OR BUILDINGS. 
This requirement of an open, visible and well marked 
boundary finds its roots in the early landmark cases which 
established the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. Holmes 
v. Judge, supra, Brown v. Milliner, 120 u. 16, 232 P.2d 202 
(1951). The requirement that the boundary be open, visible 
or well-marked by monuments is a method of testing whether 
the claimant's to disputed land have reasonably believed 
that such monuments are the actual boundaries of their land. 
When the Court finds that no one could reasonably believe 
that a particular line was the boundary, the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence is denied. Tripp v. Bagley, 
supra. The Court in Tripp found that the claimed boundary 
line, a zig zag fence built upon the prairie, could not 
possibly have been regarded as the boundary by reasonable 
men. But reasonableness is determined from the circum-
stances of each case as Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725 (1974) 
makes clear. In Baum, the Court noted that even a zig zag 
8 
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line can be the boundary of land acquired by acquiescence, 
especially if it is tied to natural monuments as it was in 
Baum. 
The facts of the instant controversy satisfy this first 
requirement. The disputed boundary had been marked by an 
ancient fence whose origin dates past the memory of any of 
the disputants or their predecessors in title. 
The trial court found that reliance on the ancient 
fence was not justified. In his memorandum decision, the 
Court stated that "the section lines can be determined with 
very little effort" and that it was obvious from the surround-
ing fences that the disputed fence encroaches,two (2) rods 
onto Respondent's property. These conclusions of the Court 
come and can come only after having had the benefit of the 
testimony of several witnesses, especially the testimony of 
the County Surveyor. But Appellant's had no such testimony 
nor schooling in surveying with which to locate their bound-
aries. The testimony at trial, expecially that of the County 
Surveyor, shows that reliance on the existing fences as bound-
ary markers is not unreasonable. The County Surveyor testified 
that even if Appellant had looked for a section corner monu-
ment, she would not have found one but would have had to 
establish one as he did. He testified that in establishing 
such a corner he presumes the fences to make property bound-
aries, and it is from this presumption that he operates in 
taking measurements to interpelate the correct location of 
markers. Such interpelation was possible only after the 
9 
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County Surveyor had searched for and found only three of four 
markers, two of which where ordinary stones found lying on the 
ground, all at least a mile from the disputed corner. 
T' ~ cross ·. "<amination of Appellant by Respondent's 
attorney at trial attempted to show that Appellant had failed 
to heed the legal description of the deed by which she claimed 
title to her land. Apparently, the thrust of his cross exam-
ination was that all, no matter what the circumstances may be, 
should be held to a duty to locate boundaries with the knowledge 
of surveyors, and that that knowledge would have immediately 
alerted Appellant and all others like her to the fact that, 
despite an ancient fence line, the true boundary was some thirty· 
three (33) feet north of the fence line. 
To require conduct consistant with such high levels of 
knowledge is too much. This fact is apparent when it is 
realized that the County Surveyor performed his task of lo-
cating the section corner at the request of another engineer-
surveyor who lived in a nearby town. The other surveyor needed 
the section corner in order to start his survey. Knowledge 
rising to the level of a surveyor's surveyor is an unreason-
able requirement to make of land owners, especially when a 
fence has stood on the presumed boundaries for longer than any 
living soul can rereember. 
Further, nothing in the three chains of title through 
which Appellant holds title to her land can be construed as 
notice to her that the fence line could not reasonably be her 
boundary. The deeds make specific mention of a right of way 
for road imposed on the west side of the property. Any 
10 
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reference to a right of way for road along the southern 
boundary is conspicuously missing from deeds affecting the 
southern boundary. Such conspicuous absence of a right of 
way for road in light of the conspicuous presence of a right 
of way for road creates a strong, justified impression that 
rights of way to the south do not exist and there are no 
problems regarding the boundary. Respondent's whole argu-
ment is that Appellant knew the fence line was off the true 
boundary to provide for a right of way for a road which was 
to be built. Neither Appellant nor her predecessors had 
actual or constructive knowledge of such a right of-way, and 
it strains the limits of reasonableness for Respondent to claim 
that he has waited and is now still waiting for a road which 
has been over forty years in coming. 
There are two irregularities which appear in Appellant's 
abstracts which consist of an Affidavit and a Quit Claim 
evidencing that A. E. Roche, a predecessor of Appellant, re-
linquished his claim to land in Section 23. That dispute 
occurred in the 1920's at a time when none of the witnesses 
who are predecessors in title here would have had first hand, 
clear knowledge of the nature of the dispute. In addition, 
the Quit Claim Deed and Affidavit become meaningful only if 
the true boundary to Section 23 was known to the relevant 
parties. Because section lines do not exist in nature on the 
face of the land, it would be only reasonable for Appellant 
and her predecessors in title to even more confidently assume 
that, though there was once a dispute to the boundary line, 
11 
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that that dispute had been settled and the fence stood as a 
memorial of its settlement. It is not reasonable to assume 
that after a victory in a dispute over one's own boundaries 
that the victor would then rebuild the fence upon the exact 
line which marked the claim of the other's encroachment. 
B. THERE MUST BE MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN THE LINE 
AS THE BOUNDARY. 
The name of the doctrine suggests that there must be 
some sort of dispute or controversy or uncertainty as to the 
true location of the boundary. Tripp v. Bagley, supra. 
Were it not so, one party could not acquiesce or give in to 
the assertions of another. The requirement of dispute or 
uncertainty is often implied as a matter of law as the Utah 
Courts have made clear. 
"In some of the opinions of this Court on the 
subject of disputed boundaries, there are state-
ments to the effect that the location of the true 
boundary must be uncertain, unknown or in dispute 
before an agreement between the adjoining land 
owners fixing the boundary will be upheld, citing 
Tripp v. Bagley, supra, in support thereof. Such 
statements should be understood to mean that if 
the location of the true boundary line is known 
to the adjoining owners, they cannot by parol 
agreement establish the boundary elsewhere. As 
was poin~ed out in the Tripp case, such an agree-
ment would be in contravention of the statute of 
frauds. But the Tripp case does not require a party 
relying upon a boundary which has been acquiesced 
in for a long period of time to produce evidence that 
the location of the true boundary was ever unknown, 
uncertain or in dispute. That the true boundary line 
was uncertain or in dispute and that the parties 
agreed upon the recognized boundary as the dividing 
line will be impljed from the parties' long acqui-
escence. 0 (Brown v. Milliner, supra, at 208). 
The implication by law of a dispute or uncertain 
12 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
boundary may or may not be needed in the instant case be-
cause Respondent's witness and predecessor testified that he 
thought there was an actual dispute clear back in 1933 when 
he first became acquainted with the fence. During cross 
examination he admitted that though he thought there was a 
dispute as to the fence's location that went back in time for 
two generations, he built a new fence over an even older fence 
whose creation dated back at least through the thirties. 
Further, since the time of his construction of the fence he 
admitted that he did in fact acquiesce in the use of the land 
on the north side of the fence from 1933, and that since 1933 
he never disputed nor interfered with the exclusive use of 
the property by his neighbors. 
Respondent maintains, though, that he never agreed to 
nor intended the fence to be or become a boundary line, but 
that he has always considered the fence to be a barrier to 
animals and nothing more. In Brown, though, the Court clarifies 
that the doctrine of boundary by acquiesence does not require 
an express agreement as to the fence as the boundary. 
"We have further held in this state that in the 
absence of evidence that the owners of adjoining 
property or their predecessors in title ever ex-
pressly agieed as to the location of the boundary 
between them, if they have occupied their respec-
tive boundaries up to an open boundary line vis-
ibly marked by monuments, fences or buildings for 
a long period of time and mutually recognized it 
as the dividing line between them, the law will 
imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located, 
if it can do so consistently with the facts appear-
ing and will not permit the parties nor their gra~tees to depart from such line. Holmes v. Judge, 
31 u. 269, 87 Pac. 1009." (~,supra, at 204}. 
13 
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In the later case of liumrnel v. Yuung, l U ~rl 2:17, ?65 
P.2d 410 (1953) the Court restates the Brown rule that even 
if there is no proof of agreement of the fence as the boundary, 
such agreement will be implied by law if the boundary was 
clear, visible and marked by monuments and mutually recognized 
as the dividing line if the facts allow a reasonable reference 
of agreement. In Hummel such a reasonable inference of 
agreement was not found from the factual situation. Justices 
Wade and Crockett wrote interesting concurrences in that 
case. 
" ... The talk of an agreement is merely the legal 
or roundabout method used by the Courts in holding 
that acquiescence alone is sufficient and it is 
immaterial whether such an agreement was ever 
reached. To that effect is Holmes v. Judge, one 
of our earliest and most carefully considered 
cases .... We quoted with approval from Baldwin 
v. Brown, [16 N.U. 359, at page 363) as follows: 
* * * The acquiescence in such cases 
affords ground, not merely for an in-
ference of fact to go to the jury as 
evidence of an original parol agree-
ment, but for a direct legal inference 
as to the true boundary line * * * . 
[Emphasis in original) . 
This quotation clearly holds ... that the true boundary 
line will be inferred ... as a matter of law, and that 
evidence that there was no agreement is inadmissible 
because it is i_mmaterial. (Hummel v. Young, supra, 
at 413). " 
In Hummel and the later case of Ri~gwood v. Bradford, 
2 u. 2d 119, 269 P.2d 1053 (1954) the Court recognizes that 
there are certain situations where the law will allow the 
presumption to be rebutted. If the parties knew that the 
line they acquiesced in was not the true boundary line or if 
they temporarily set a boundary with the express understanf ing 
that the boundary would be later determined, and possibly if 
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the line was acquiesced in by mistake, the presumption will 
not hold. But both cases make it clear that the mere proof 
of a lack of agreement is not alone sufficient to rebut the 
presumption. 
In the instant case the facts reasonably allow the pre-
sumption of the law to stand. Relying heavily upon Wright 
v. Clissold, 521 P.2d 1224 (1974) Respondent argues that the 
fence was built entirely for the control of animals and not 
built to settle a boundary dispute; he argues that Wright is 
exactly the same as the instant case. Respondent's reliance 
upon the Wright case stems primarily from that case's dis-
cussion between fences built as animal barriers and fences 
built to settle boundaries. Apparently Respondent feels 
that this fact would put his case into one of the exceptions 
recognized in Hummel and Ringwood. Respondent's attorney 
elicited testimony that the fence was built solely as an 
animal barrier and not as a boundary division. But the 
facts involved in Wright are substantially different from 
those here. In Wright though the fence line dated back to 
1933, it appears that before its purchase by Defendant in 
1946 (Defendant is claiming the land by asserting acquiescence) 
the fence was used only to hold cattle and did not serve as 
a division between adjoining land owners simply because 
there were no neighbors whose boundaries had to be defined. 
Whereas, for as far back as memory goes, the fence in the 
instant case has been relied on as a boundary line. Two 
years after his purchase the Defendant in Wright was advised 
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that the fence was not the boundary and after his attempt to 
buy the di~puted parcel failed, Defendant continued in his 
use of the land for only another twenty (20) years before 
suit was brought. This was a much shorter period than is 
involved in the instant dispute. There was even testimony 
at trial that the Defendant in Wright once admitted in 1962 
that he did not own the disputed parcel and that he used it 
on the owner's permission; while here, Appellant never made 
such a confession but has always maintained that she owned 
to the fence. 
Further, in Appellant's research, the only case which 
ever cites Wright v. Clissold is the case of Baum v. Defa, 
525 P.2d 725 (1974). In Baum the Court refers to the Wright 
holding regarding fences built solely as animal barriers and 
then adds an important clarification that fences built 
initially as animal barriers may later become property 
division lines. 
non the other hand, if the property on either 
side of such a fence is conveyed to separate 
parties, so that there comes into being 
separate ownership of the tracts on either 
side, and the circumstances are such that the 
parties should reasonably be assumed to adopt 
the fence as the boundary between their prop-
erties, then from that time on, the time 
during which the fence continues to exist, 
should be regarded as going toward the ful-
filling the time requirement for the estab-
lishment of boundary by acquiescence.n 
(Baum, supra, at 727). 
In Baum the separate ownership of properties on each 
side of the fence continued for only twenty-six (26) years 
and involved a zig zag fence, but the Court still found that 
a boundary by acquiescence had been created. In the instant 
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case, ownership has been for a much longer time and the 
fence is straight and easily presumed from t·1e circumstances 
existent at the time that the respective property owners 
started using the fence as a division line to be the division 
between Sections 13 and 14. 
The 1974 Baum case in which Justice Crockett was joined 
by Chief Justice Callister and Justices Henroid, Ellet, and 
Tuckett relied heavily upon the policy which undergirds the 
doctrine. 
"The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence derives 
from realization, ancient in our law, that the 
peace and good order of society is best served 
by leaving at rest possible disputes over long 
established boundaries. Its essence is that 
where there has been any type of recognizable 
physical boundary, which has been accepted as 
such for a long period of time, it should be 
presumed that any dispute or disagreement has 
been reconciled in some manner." {Baum, supra, 
at 726). 
In summary of this element, it is established from the 
evidence that the fence stood for over forty years and 
served as the division between the adjoining properties. 
Respondent's predecessor admitted that he has never inter-
fered with Appellant's use of the land, and Appellant and 
her predecessors testified that they always used the land 
right to the fence as their own; though the fence may have 
been constructed to hold animals, it has since served as the 
recognized division between the two properties for over 
forty years. 
C. THE FENCES MUST STAND FOR A LONG PERIOD OF YEARS. 
The laws requires the existence of the division line for 
a long period of time in order to create the presumption of 
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agreement. The period required will depend on the circum-
stances, but unless unusual circumstances exist, twenty years 
is usually considered the minimum. Hobson v. Panguitch Lake 
Corp, 530 P.2d 792 (1975). In Baum v. Defa, supra, the Court 
found that a period of twenty-six (26) years was enough. As 
has been pointed out before, the fence line in the instant 
dispute is over forty (40) years old. 
D. THE DIVISION LINE MUST EXIST BETWEEN ADJOINING 
LANDOWNERS. 
The fourth requirement in establishing a boundary by 
acquiescence requires that the division line must exist be-
tween adjoining landowners. Whether the adjoining landowners 
must establish the entirety of the long holding period them-
selves or whether present landowners may "tack" the period of 
possession of their predecessors in title has never been clearly 
decided in Utah on the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, 
though it is clear for adverse possession. 
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is quite similar 
to U.C.A. 78-12-10, adverse possession "under claim not founded 
on written instrument or judgment" and the rule of tacking 
should follow the adverse possession rule. In fact, the 
annotations to that section include a heading labeled "Boundary 
by Acquiescence" . 
The Utah Courts follow the general rule requiring privity 
between those who wish to tack holding periods. In Homeowner's 
Loan Corporation v. Dudley, 105 U. 208, 141 P.2d 160 (1943), 
the Court at 168 cites the A.L.R. annotation. At 46 A.L.R. 
792 - 799 the general rule is "that a deed does not of itself 
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create privity between the grantor and the grantee as to land 
not described in the deed, but occupied by the grantor in 
connection therewith, although the grantee enters into posses-
sion of tha land not described and uses it in connection with 
that conveyed". In the instant case, the land which Appellant 
now claims is technically land not found with!~ the deed's 
description and thus, at first blush, it appears that Appellant 
will not be allowed the benefit of the long period of continuous 
holding of her predecessors. But this rule does not apply here. 
This is because the deed description by itself is not adequate 
to locate the property boundaries unless those boundaries are 
marked by something: Section lines do not appear in nature 
upon the face of the earth. Appellant and her predecessors 
reasonably and naturally assumed that their deed's descriptions 
conveyed property which ran right up to the fence which they 
thought marked the southern boundary of Section 14. The A.L.R. 
annotation recognizes this situation and at 793 the limitations 
to the general rule is outlined. 
"The foregoing rule is very strictly limited (see 
the following subdivision of this annotation), and, 
while broader language may be found in some cases, 
it is apparently applicable to those cases only 
wherein the deed itself is relied on solely to 
create privi~y, and there is no circumstance show-
ing an intent to transfer the possession of any 
property beyond the calls of the deed." 
At 797 the annotation quotes Naher v. Farmer, 60 Wash. 
nOO, 111 P. 768 (1910) which illustrates the well-recognized 
limitation and allows tacking of a predecessor's holding period. 
"While it is true that the deeds which passed 
title to the successive owners described only 
Lot 4, there was nothing to indicate the bound-
aries of that lot upon the ground except as it was 
enclosed and improved. It appears that the owner, 
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from the time of the purchase by Mr. Broughton 
in 1898 down to the time of this action, believed 
that Lot 4 was the tract of land within the en-
closure, and possession of the enclosed premises 
was held openly and exclusively, and the convey-
ances made thereof as Lot 4. Under these circum-
stances the description in the deed must be held 
to include the land in dispute." 
The Court here is asked to authoritatively adopt the 
same line of reasoning it has applied to adverse possession 
to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. Such reasoning 
seems to have been applied in the l~63 case of King v. Fronk, 
14 U.2d 135, 378 P.2d 893 (1963). In that case the same 
District Court as the District Court in the instant case held 
that the proof did not justify the claim by acquiescence to 
the disputed land. The Supreme Court reversed the District 
Court and granted the land to the claiming party, but neither 
Court ruled directly on the issue of tacking. The claiming 
party had not held the land for over twenty (20) years, but 
was still in the process of purchasing it under contract from 
one who acquired the land in 1945, which period is only sixteen 
(16) years to the date of the first protest by the acquiescing 
party in 1961. In 1961, the acquiescing party had held the 
land personally for thirteen (13) years. The Court there 
reviews cases which discuss the length of period needed to 
create the presumption and states that " ... it seems to us that 
establishment of boundary by acquiescence must be predicated 
upon the existence of a visibly monumented line persisting 
for at least twenty (20) years or upwards ..• (King, supra, at 
897)". The Court in King required at least twenty (20) years, 
but the disputants had held the land personally for less than 
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that period, though their chains of title went back for thirty-
five (35) years. King tacitly permitted tacking, but a defini-
tive statement in the instant case on the issue of tacking will 
do much to clarify the requirements of the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence. 
CONCLUSION 
The elements required to establish as a matter of legal 
implication a boundary by acquiescence were all clearly present 
and undisputed here. The fence line had been a (1) visible 
monument which (2) Respondent and his predecessors allowed to 
stand as the property division line (3) for a period of at 
least forty (40) years (4) between their interests and those 
of Appellant and her predecessors. 
The legal presumption was established at trial, and as 
a matter of law the lower Court should have ruled in Appellant's 
favor. Appellant hereby prays for a reversal of the lower 
decision which was clearly against the evidence. 
D pru 
for Appella 
29 South Main Street 
P. o. Box U 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SERVED the foregoing Brief of Appellant by mailing two 
copies thereof, postage prepaid, to WALTER G. MANN, MANN, 
HADFIELD & THORNE, Attorney for Respondent, 35 First Security 
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Bank Building, Brigham City, Utah 84302, this /!(' day of 
October, 1978. 
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